Children and Pornography:  An Interest Analysis in System Perspective by Green, William
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 19 
Number 2 Winter 1985 pp.441-470 
Winter 1985 
Children and Pornography: An Interest Analysis in System 
Perspective 
William Green 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William Green, Children and Pornography: An Interest Analysis in System Perspective , 19 Val. U. L. Rev. 
441 (1985). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University 
Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
CHILDREN AND PORNOGRAPHY:
AN INTEREST ANALYSIS IN SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE
WILLIAM GREEN*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
P REFA CE ............................................. 441
I. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: PORNOGRAPHY SYSTEM AND
PARTICIPANT INTERESTS ............................... 442
II. CHILDREN AS RECIPIENTS .............................. 446
Child Obscenity Standard ........................... 446
Ginsberg v. New York ............................ 448
Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville ................. 448
Child-Based Indecency Standard ...................... 449
F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation ..................... 450
Implications of Pacifica ........................... 452
III. CHILDREN AS ACTORS ................................. 454
Child Pornography Legislation ....................... 455
Child Pornography Decisions ........................ 456
New York v. Ferber .............................. 460
Im pact of Ferber ................................. 464
IV . CONCLUSIONS ......................................... 469
ILLUSTRATIONS
page
FIGURE 1: Children, the Pornography System and the Law.. 443
FIGURE 2: Participants' Legal Interest Model ............... 444
FIGURE 3: Use of Obscenity Definitions in Child
Pornography Statutes .......................... 456
PREFACE
The sexual exploitation of children is an object of public con-
cern. State and federal governments have enacted child obscenity and
pornography statutes to protect children from abuse in the produc-
tion of pornography and from harm in the sale of obscene materials.
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These enactments have raised free speech, due process, and privacy
questions. This article will examine how these issues have been
judicially resolved. In general, it will argue that the crucial factor
in judicial resolution is the weight 'courts have given to free speech
interests. In this regard, it will argue that courts have more easily
resolved child pornography production issues by defining them as con-
duct unprotected by the first amendment. At the same time, this
article will argue that courts have had greater problems in resolving
obscenity and child pornography distribution issues, because of the
greater importance they have attached to the free speech interests
of children, parents, and other adults.
Part I will provide a framework for the analysis of these issues.
Part II will examine the legal regulation of children as recipients of
pornography: the evolution of a children's obscenity standard in
Ginsberg v. New York' and Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville and the
creation of a child-based indecency standard for broadcasting in
Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation.' Part III
will examine the legal regulation of children as actors in the produc-
tion of pornography, via the Supreme Court's decision in New York
v. Ferber,4 and its impact on appellate and trial courts. Part IV will
draw some conclusions about these judicial decisions, their impact on
the public and private interests involved, and the issues that remain
to be decided.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK:
THE PORNOGRAPHY SYSTEM AND PARTICIPANT INTERESTS
Systems theory is a useful framework for understanding the
involvement of children in the pornographic marketplace. A system
is a set of structured interactions that converts resources (inputs) into
products (outputs) for distribution to consumers.' The pornography
industry,6 represented in Figure 1 below, is a- system which takes
human and financial resources and creates sexually appealing products
in the form of pictures, magazines, books, and movies which are
1. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
2. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
3. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
4. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
5. Easton, An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems, 9 WORLD
POLITICs 383-400 (1957).
6. The President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography reported-that
a monolithic smut industry does not exist; rather there are several distinct markets
(films, books, magazines) and submarkets which distribute a variety of erotic materials."
Lockhart, Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 7 (1970).
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distributed through bookstores, the mail, theatres, and television to
adult and children consumers.
The pornography business is composed primarily of two groups:
producers and distributors. Producers create the product using both
child and adult subjects. In the case of child pornography, the pro-
ducers are those people who coerce or entice children into participa-
tion, and also those who participate with them in and record their
sexual behavior. Distributors market the product. Obscene and inde-
cent materials are sold to both children and adults, but adults are
the principal consumers of child pornography. Therefore, children are
involved in the pornography industry's input and output functions as
its subjects and objects; they are actors, resources for the production
of pornography, and consumers, recipients for the distribution of in-
decent and obscene materials.
FIGURE 1
CHILDREN, THE PORNOGRAPHY SYSTEM, AND
(INPUTS) Child Pornography
Statutes
THE LAW
(OUTPUTS)
Production Distribut
Adults
Solicitation " Promotion &
Children Production ornography Distribution
I Children
Child
Obscenity
Statutes
ion
This youthful participation has become a matter of public con-
cern. As a consequence, state and federal governments have passed
two types of legislation to protect children: obscenity and child por-
nography statutes Child pornography statutes are input-oriented: they
permit the prosecution of the producers of child pornography.
Obscenity statutes (output-oriented) are of two types. One type, child
obscenity statutes, outlaw distribution to juveniles. The other, child
7. Most states control the distribution of obscene material by statute. In
Kentucky the advertising, promotion and distribution of obscene material is prohibited
by Ky.Rev.Stat. SS 531.050, .060, .020; using minors to distribute obscene material by
S 531.040; and the distribution of obscene materials to minors by S 531.030. Most states
also control child pornography. For a recent comprehensive list, see Ferber, 458 U.S.
at 749. In Kentucky, the production and distribution of child pornography controlled
by Ky. Rev. Stat. S 531.300.
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pornography statutes, permit the prosecution of persons involved in
the promotion and sale of child pornography in order to eliminate the
sexual abuse of children in its creation.
Obscenity prosecutions under federal and state statutes have
raised fundamental questions about private and public interests. The
participant interests in these cases are expressed in terms of the four
models which are represented in Figure 2 below.
FIGURE 2
PARTICIPANTS' LEGAL INTEREST MODEL
Government Interests
Model
#1
Parent # 3 W #2 Adult Rights
Rights Model: Model
#4
Children's Rights
Model
The Government Interests Model (#1) recognizes four interests.
First, the state has an interest in the health, safety, morals, and
general welfare of all its citizens, but it uses this police power
primarily on behalf of its adult citizens Second, "[t]he State also has
an independent interest in the well-being of its youth."9 Under its
parens patriae and police powers it has the authority to protect the
welfare of children from abuses from anyone. It may also use these
powers to override parental decisions in order to protect individual
children from neglect or abuse and to promote the general public's
health and safety." Third, there is the state's interest in supporting
"the parent's claim to authority in their own household to direct the
rearing of their children."'" Fourth, there is the state's interest in
safeguarding and strengthening the family and the relationships among
parents and children."2
8. The police power is the basis for state obscenity and child pornography
statutes. Id. The fedeal government also has a "police power" under its postal and
commerce powers to regulate obscenity and child pornography. See infra note 28.
9. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640.
10. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (state child labor law upheld
as applied to a child distributing religious materials) and Jacobsen v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905) (state compulsory vaccination of children upheld in spite of religious
objections of parents).
11. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639.
12. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (states requirement that physician
provide notice to parents of a minor's abortion decision).
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The Adult Rights Model (#2) recognizes that the vast array of
constitutional rights that people have against the exercise of govern-
mental power are conferred principally upon adults.13 As a result, this
model distinguishes between adult rights and those selected constitu-
tional rights recently extended to minor children under Model #4. The
Adult Rights Model also acknowledges that when adults become
parents, they gain additional rights under Model #3.
The Parent Rights Model (#3) recognizes the personal interest
of parents in the care of their children free from state interference.
The Court has acknowledged the primary responsibility of parents
to direct the upbringing of their children1 4 as an aspect of liberty pro-
tected by the due process 5 and free exercise clauses.16 Moreover, the
Parent Rights Model recognizes that parents share an interest with
their children in an autonomous family relationship.
The Children's Rights Model (#4) recognizes that minor children
have rights against the state. The Court has recently extended to
minors an interest in equal protection against racial discrimination
in education,18 in procedural due process in juvenile court adjudication 9
school disciplinary proceedings,"0 in freedom of speech,2 and, even as
13. Constitutional rights in full force are generally conferred only upon people
who have achieved their majority, though the Supreme Court has made recent minor
alterations in this view. See infra notes 18-23.
14. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (state statute re-
quiring children to attend public school violated parent's right to educational choice
for children).
15. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state statute restricting private
school teaching to English violated parent's due process right to have children taught
German).
16. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state compulsory school atten-
dance law infringed upon the religious convictions of Amish parents).
17. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER),
431 U.S. 816 (1977) (state procedures for removing children from foster homes intruded
upon privacy rights of the foster family) and Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977) (city zoning ordinance violated the privacy of the extended family).
18. Brown v. Board, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (state statutes requiring or permitting
racial segregation in educational facilities violated equal protection rights of children).
19. Minors' rights in &iminal proceedings include protection against coerced
confessions, Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); the right to notice, counsel, con-
frontation, cross-examination, and not to incriminate oneself, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967); the prohibiiion against double jeopardy, Breed V. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975),
and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970).
20. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (public school suspension of students
without notice and hearing, violates their due process rights).
21. Tinker v. DesMoines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (school regula-
tion forbidding the wearing of armband violated student's free speech right).
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against their parents, in personal privacy to make decisions about
contraception2 and abortion.' At the same time, the Children's Rights
Model also recognizes the minor's due process interest in the family
relationship, because of an interest in receiving parental guidance.24
The Supreme Court's decisions in cases involving children and
pornography have turned upon its evaluation of Model #1 governmen-
tal interests and the Model #2, #3, and #4 first amendment, due
process, and privacy rights of adults, parents, and children. Parts II
and III of this analysis will examine how the Court's decisions in cases
involving children as participants in the creation and consumption of
pornography have affected these participant interests.
II
CHILDREN AS CONSUMERS
Government regulation of the involvement of children with por-
nography began, not with the creation of the product, but with its
distribution. The following analysis will examine the child obscenity
standard developed in Ginsberg v. New York25 and Erznoznick v.
Jacksonville' and the child-based broadcast indecency standard created
in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation.7
Child Obscenity Standard
Federal and state governments regulate the distribution of
obscene material. Federal statutes restrict the importation, mailing
or communication of obscene materials.' States have general obscenity
statutes which impose criminal penalties on those who distribute
22. Carey v. Population Services Internat'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (state law
restricting sale of contraceptives to minors violate their right to privacy).
23. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (state statute requir-
ing written consent by parents or spouse to a woman's abortion decision violates her
right to privacy).
24. See supra note 17.
25. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
26. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
27. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
28. The Tariff Act is 19 U.S.C. S 1305 (1976). The basic postal statute, 18
U.S.C. S 1461, prohibits the knowing use of the mails for the mailing or delivery of
obscene materials. Another postal statute, the Anti-Pandering Act, 39 U.S.C. S 4009
(1976), leaves the matter of erotic arousal at the sole discretion of the individual postal
patron. The FBI Statute, 18 U.S.C. S 1462 (1976), prohibits the use of common carriers
for the importation or interstate transportation of obscene materials and 18 U.S.C.
S 1465 (1976) prohibits the interstate transportation of obscene material for sale or
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 3
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obscene material.' The Supreme Court has generally upheld these
Atatutes, because it has found that obscenity as a class of speech is
hot entitled to any constitutional protection because it is without
redeeming social value."
Whether the material is obscene is determined by an internal
test first announced in Roth v. United States"1 and later elaborated
in Miller v. California.2 It is a test based solely on the anticipated
effect of the material on the average adult. It requires the trier of
fact to apply contemporary community standards to an examination
of the material alleged to be obscene and to determine whether the
work taken as a whole describes sex in a patently offensive way;
appeals to the prurient interest in sex; and lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. If the material passes the test,
it is obscene.'
Obscenity under the Roth-Miller test is also a constant concept,
because the intentions of the distributor, the manner of distribution,
and the identity of the recipients are unimportant. Commercial
distribution of obscene material to adults is unprotected by the first
amendment. As the Court said in Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton: "com-
mercial exploitation of depictions, descriptions, or exhibitions of
obscene conduct. . . falls within a State's broad power to regulate
commerce and protect the public environment."34
Whether pornographic materials, non-obscene for adults, would
be obscene for children was not considered by the Court until the
appearance of an external test for obscenity. In Ginsburg v. United
States" and Mishkin v. New York," the Court announced the concept
of variable obscenity: the circumstances of distribution could make
obscene material which was otherwise protected expression. Redrup
v. New York3 7 extended the concept by holding that the obscenity of
material would also depend upon whether it was pandered or sold
distribution. The FCC Statute, 18 U.S.C. S 1464 (1976), prohibits the use of radio or
television to utter "obscene, indecent, or profane language."
29. Supra note 7.
30. Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (later elaborated in Miller v. Cal., 413
U.S. 15 (1973)).
31. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
32. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
33. Id. at 24.
34. 413 U.S. 49, 68-69 (1972).
35. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
36. 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
37. 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
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to juveniles." Whether material was obscene for children, however,
involved more than just a conflict between a child's right to free
expression and the public interest in morality. The sale of pornography
to children raised other questions. Could the government's interest
in the protection of children qualify the right of parents to educate
their children and the right of adults to protected materials? The Court
addressed this question initially in Ginsberg v. New York 9 and
Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville0 which will be examined below.
Ginsberg v. New York
Could a state prohibit the sale of printed material to minors
defined as obscene on the basis of its appeal to them, though it would
not necessarily be obscene to adults? Justice Brennan, speaking for
the majority in Ginsberg, found that it was reasonable for a state to
conclude that a minor's exposure to such material might be harmful
and to enact a statute such as New York's which "simply adjusts the
definition of obscenity to social realities by permitting the appeal of
this type of material to be assessed in terms of the sexual interest
. . . of minors."41
Two state interests justified a limitation on the availability of
obscene material to minors. One was the state's "independent interest
in the well-being of its youth."4 The other interest supported "the
parents' claim to authority ... to direct the rearing of their children."'
It is clear that the statute was more than merely supportive, because
it denied parents, if they wished, the right to allow their children
to have uninhibited access to books and magazines."' Nonetheless,
Justice Brennan claimed that the statute did not "bar parents who
so desire[d] from purchasing the magazines for their children.""5
Therefore, Ginsberg did not explicitly discuss the rights of adults, but
one could assume that if the statute did not bar parental purchases,
it would not impair an adult's right of access to a bookstore or theatre.
Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville
Could a city in the exercise of its police power prohibit the
exhibition of non-obscene nudity in drive-in movies visible from "any
38. Id. at 769.
39. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 629.
40. Erznoznick, 422 U.S. at 205.
41. Ginsberg, 390. U.S. at 638.
42. Id. at 640.
43. Id. at 639.
44. Id. at 674 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 639.
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public street or public place" in order to protect children?" Justice
Powell, speaking for the Court in Erznoznick agreed that the city could
"adopt more stringent controls on communicative materials available
to youths."4 At the same time, the city had to acknowledge that even
though the first amendment rights of minors were not co-extensive
with those of adults, "minors [were] entitled to a significant measure
of First Amendment protection"4" which included the right to view
non-obscene nudity.
The Jacksonville ordinance, judged by this standard, was fatally
overbroad as applied to children, because it was not directed against
sexually-explicit nudity, but forbade all nudity in outdoor films. "All
nudity," Justice Powell said, "cannot be deemed obscene even as to
minors. . . ." under the Ginsberg obscenity standard.49 Non-obscene
speech could not be suppressed "solely to protect the young from ideas
or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them."' Thus
Erznoznick acknowledged the post-Miller validity of the Ginsberg child
obscenity standard, but it did not discuss whether public exhibitions
not obscene to adults could be restricted, because they were obscene
to children.
The Child-Based Indecency Standard
The federal government also regulates the distribution of non-
obscene material. Federal statutes restrict the mailing and broadcast
of indecent material. The Supreme Court first upheld this governmen-
tal action in Rowan v. United States Post Office Department5 ' where
it approved of the Anti-Pandering Act, 19 U.S.C. S 4009," which leaves
the matter of erotic arousal at the sole discretion of the individual
postal patron who has the right to obtain from a post office a pro-
hibitory order against the advertiser even though the material was
not obscene by any objective standard.
The Court's decision in Rowan is, however, rather limited in its
application. It upheld only the right of an adult to make a personal
46. Erznoznick, 422 U.S. at 205.
47. Id. at 212.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 213.
50. Id. at 213-14.
51. 397 U.S. 728 (1971).
52. Section 4009 permits a person who has received "a pandering advertise-
ment which offers for sale matter which the addressee in his sole discretion believes
to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative" to request the post office to issue
an order directing the advertiser to refrain from further mailings. 19 U.S.C. S 4009 (1976).
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judgment about a mailed advertisement. Moreover, it did not consider
whether the child had a right to refuse offensive material, whether
the parents had discretion under section 4009(g) to determine what
material a child may receive,' nor whether the state's parens patriae
power could prevail over parental discretion., These issues, along with
the free speech-rights of adults, were addressed in the much wider
context of radio broadcasting.
Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation
Could the FCC regulate radio broadcasts non-obscene for
children? The issue was raised one afternoon when WBAI, a Pacifica
Foundation radio station, broadcast George Carlin's "dirty words"
monologue. The FCC, acting on a complaint from a listener, concluded
that the monologue "depicted sexual and excretory activities and
organs in a manner patently offensive by contemporary standards for
the broadcast medium""5 and was prohibited as indecent under 18
U.S.C. S 1464.' The Court of Appeals reversed. 7 On appeal, the
Supreme Court upheld the Commission, 5 to 4.58
Justice Stevens in his opinion for the Court read the statutory
language's prohibition on the use of "any obscene, indecent, or pro-
fane language by means of radio communication" in the disjunctive;59
determined that indecent meant "nonconformance with accepted stan-
dards of morality";' and then agreed with the Commission's conclu-
sion that indecent language was used in the Pacifica broadcast. 1
53. Section 4009(g) allows the post office to include in any prohibitive order
"the names of any minor children who have not attained their nineteenth birthday
and who reside with the addressee." 19 U.S.C. S 4009(g) (1976).
54. The Supreme Court has never ruled on whether there is any limit to a
parent's discretion in determining what reading material a child may bring into the
home, though Ginsberg suggests that the state has an interest to see children are
safeguarded from abuse.
55. In re A Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI(FM),
56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975).
56. 18 U.S.C. S 1464 (1976).
57. 556 F.2d 9 (D.C.Cir. 1977).
58. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726. A majority opinion written by Justice Stevens was
joined by four members of the Court: Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun,
Powell and Rehnquist. Justice Powell joined by Blackmun concurred in part in the
opinion and the judgment. Justice Brennan, joined by Marshall, dissented on constitu-
tional grounds. Justice Stewart, joined by Brennan, White, and Marshall, dissented
on statutory grounds.
59. Id. at 739-40.
60. Id. at 740.
61. Id. at 741.
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Justice Stevens found no constitutional barrier to the FCC's authority
to impose a time regulation on the indecent radio broadcast.2 Two
characteristics of the broadcast media justified this regulation of
indecent speech: the impact of the broadcast media on an adult's
privacy in the home and the media's easy accessibility to children. 3
The Pacifica decision is noteworthy, because it is the first
instance in which the Court has upheld the federal government's power
to restrict non-obscene speech. One commentator observed: "the
Pacifica Court tacitly embraced a general or national standard of
decency" for broadcasting. 4 The Court offered two justifications, but
the privacy rational is flawed. "[C]hanneling indecent broadcasts ..
. cannot possibly protect that interest. . . [, because] it will do nothing
to aid the unwilling adult listeners who randomly tune in at night."65
As a consequence, the protection of young children is the only interest
advanced by the Court which can justify the regulation of broadcast
indecency. This interest, however, makes major alterations in the
rights of children, their parents, and other adults in their access to
non-obscene broadcasting.
The Court had recognized the government's interest in the well-
being of youth by adopting a children's obscenity standard in Ginsberg.
In broadcasting, however, the Court assumed that Ginsberg was
insufficient, because the Pacifica decision "allows the government to
prevent minors from gaining access to materials that are not
obscene."6 In doing so, Pacifica also disregards the admonition in
Erznoznick that "speech that is [not] .. .obscene as to youths . ..
cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images
that a legislative body thinks [are] unsuitable for them. 17
The Court recognized in Ginsberg the governmental interest in
supporting parental authority. Justice Stevens, citing Ginsberg, claimed
that the Court's interest in preventing children from hearing offen-
-sive broadcasts supported "the parents' claim to authority in their
own household."68 Like Ginsberg, Pacifica restricts the rights of those
parents who may find it desirable to expose their children to the Carlin
monologue. 9 However, Pacifica goes one step further. The offensive
62. Id. at 750-51.
63. Id. at 748-50. See also id. at 755-61 (Powell, J., concurring).
64. The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REv. 57, 157 (1978).
65. Id. at 160.
66. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 767 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 768. (Quoting Erznoznick, supra note 46).
68. Id. at 749. (Quoting Ginsberg, supra notes 11 & 41).
69. Id. at 770 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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material will be available to parents only at times when children are
not likely to be in the listening audience."
The Court's decision in Ginsberg did not impair the access of
adults to books, magazines, records, and movies. This physical separa-
tion of the audience is not possible in the broadcast media. As a con-
sequence, Pacifica raised the question as to whether the FCC's action
violated the principle of Butler v. Michigan; government may not
regulate the distribution of pornography to children in a manner that
prevents adults from gaining access to protected materials and,
thereby, "reduces the adult population . . . to reading only what is
fit for children."71 The Pacifica majority claimed that the regulation
of indecent broadcasting did not violate the principle of Butler. The
Commission's decision had not closed all broadcasting to indecent
speech. 2 Adults, Justice Powell said, may hear the monologue "dur-
ing late evening hours when fewer children are likely to be in the
audience."73 Moreover, the FCC ruling did not restrict adult use of
alternative forums. "Adults who feel the need may purchase tapes
and records or go to the theatres and nightclubs to hear these
words."74 Justice Powell in his concurring opinion was more cautious.
"Butler... is not without force," he said, "but it is not sufficiently
strong to leave the Commission powerless to act... in this case."75
Implications of Pacifica
What Pacifica means is unclear. Justice Stevens claimed that
the Court's review was limited to the Commission's decision "that the
Carlin monologue was indecent as broadcast."7 Justice Brennan was
profoundly disturbed by the implications of the majority's action: it
was the product of "acute ethnocentric myopia."77 His dissent raised
three questions about the meaning of Pacifica.
What will a broadcast indecency standard mean and what will
be its effect? Justice Brennan argued that there will be greater
problems than those encountered in defining obscenity. Indecency is
a less precise term. Moreover, he claimed that its implementation
would destroy cultural diversity, because a decency standard would
70. Id. at 768 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
72. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.
73. Id. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 750 n. 28. See also id. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 735. See also id. at 755-56 (Powell, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 775.
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be likely to be a reflection of the will "of the dominant culture's
• . . thinking, acting, and speaking.""
What does "as broadcast" mean? Justice Brennan argued for a
narrow view of the Court's holding. Since,
"the FCC insists [in its brief] that it desires only the
authority to reprimand a broadcaster on facts analogous to
those presented in this case . . . [the opinions of Stevens
and Powell] do no more than permit the Commission to cen-
sor the afternoon broadcast of the 'sort of verbal shock
treatment'. . . involved here."79
Pacifica may, however, have a wider meaning. As one commentator
argued, the Stevens and Powell opinions "authorized time zoning
: * , when the broadcast: (1) uses language offensive to most people
in depicting sexual or excretory activities; (2) uses that language not
incidentally, but repetitively; (3) is aired at a time of day when children
are likely to be in the audience; and (4) is likely to influence children."'
That Pacifica may have this wider meaning was not foreclosed by
Stevens when he said that whether the playing of the monologue in
the late evening would be permissible "is an issue neither the com-
mission nor this Court has decided."" s
What guidance did Pacifica provide the FCC? Justice Brennan
complained that the privacy and children rationales were "plagued
by a common failing: the lack of principled limits on their use .... ,,
Neither the Stevens nor the Powell opinions, he says, "serve to clarify
the extent to which the FCC may assert the rationales as justifica-
tion for expunging from the airways protected communication the Com-
mission finds offensive."" Indeed, Stevens' opinion in which Powell
concurred suggested no limitation on future FCC decisions. As Stevens
said:
[t]he Commission's decision rested entirely on a nuisance
rationale under which context is all important. The Con-
cept requires consideration of a host of variables. The time
of day [,] . . . [t]he content of the program in which the
language is used will affect the composition of the audience,
78. Id. at 777.
79. Id. at 771.
80. Supra note 64, at 162.
81. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 n. 28.
82. Id. at 770.
83. Id.
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and the differences between radio and television, and
perhaps closed circuit transmission, may also be relevant."
These questions Justice Brennan raised six years ago have not
been answered. No broadcaster has challenged the non-renewal of his
license by the Commission because of indecent material in its pro-
gramming. As a consequence, neither the courts of appeal, nor the
Supreme Court have had the opportunity to say what Pacifica means
besides the Commission's finding "that the Carlin [radio] monologue
was indecent as broadcast.""5 What has captured judicial attention in
the years since Pacifica has been child pornography.
III. CHILDREN AS ACTORS
Child pornography, the visual or printed depiction of a minor
child engaged in explicit sexual conduct, became the subject of govern-
ment attention after disclosures of a widespread market in 1977
revealed the inadequacy of existing legislation." Federal and state
obscenity laws did not reach the producers of child pornography, only
its distributors. 7 Moreover, "punishment [of distributors] under
obscenity statutes was not severe enough to reflect the aggravating
circumstances of child abuse involved in child pornography."' Fur-
thermore, state sexual offense and child abuse statutes did not reach
the producers of child pornography, because they failed to apply to
the abusive acts involved and the penalties they provided were too
weak." As a consequence, federal and state legislation was enacted
"to protect children directly from physical abuse in pornography and
indirectly by suppressing obscene material that might encourage fur-
ther abuse ... ."' by imposing criminal liability on all the participants
in the child pornography system. The following analysis will examine
these federal and state child pornography statutes and then turn its
attention to the Supreme Court's child pornography decision, New York
84. Id. at 750.
85. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 735, 755, 756.
86. Note, Child Pornography: A New Role for the Obscenity Doctrine, 1978 U.
ILL. L.F. 711, 713-15 (1978).
87. Virtually all child pornography is obscene under current standards. S. Rep.
No. 438, 95th Cong. 1st Sess., 12 (1978).
88. Note, Child Pornography: A New Role for the Obscenity Doctrine, supra
note 86, at 715.
89. Id. See also Comment, Protection of Children from Use in Pornography:
Toward Constitutional and Enforceable Legislation, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 295, 302 (1979).
90. Moore, Child Pornography, the First Amendment, and the Media: The Con-
stitutionality of Super-Obscenity Laws, 4 COMMIENT 125 (1978-79).
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v. Ferber,9 the cases that preceded it and the impact it has had on
trial and appellate courts.
Child Pornography Legislation
The federal Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation
Act of 197792 regulates the interstate aspects of child pornography
in two ways. First, the statute regulates conduct involved in the
solicitation-production of child pornography without regard to its
obscenity. Section 2251 forbids parents and other persons from employ-
ing children as models for the production of sexually explicit material
for interstate shipment. 3 Section 2254, more broadly applicable, makes
punishable the "causing of a minor to engage in sexual conduct for
commercial exploitation." '94 Second, section 2252 regulates distributors
by prohibiting obscene child pornography from being shipped in
interstate commerce and received for distribution and sale. 5
State statutes, like the federal act, usually contain 'production
offenses' that directly regulate the conduct of those who solicit or
procure children, and 'dissemination offenses' which "attempt to curb
sexual abuse [indirectly] by dampening economic supply and demand
for sexual depictions of children."" This state legislation is not based
on any uniform act. 7 Consequently, there are considerable variations
in the use of an obscenity standard in state child pornography statutes.
Figure 3 presents four types of state statutes with examples of each.
States like Illinois (#1) apply an obscenity definition to both
solicitation-production and distribution activities. States like Florida
(#2) follow the federal statute and dispense with an obscenity stan-
dard for solicitation-production offenses, but impose one on distribu-
tion offenses." However, no state reverses this approach (#3). States
like New York and Kentucky (#4) dispense with an obscenity require-
ment for all child pornography offenses.w These statutes prohibit all
91. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
92. P. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978).
93. 18 U.S.C. S 2251 (1978).
94. 18 U.S.C. S 2423 (1978). Section 2243 also amended the Mann Act to cover
males.
95. 18 U.S.C. S 2252 (1978).
96. Note, Child Pornography: A New Role for the Obscentity Doctrine, supra,
note 86, at 725-26.
97. Note, Child Pornography Legislation, 17 J. FAM. L. 505, 531 (1978-79).
98. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, S 11-20a (Supp. 1978). Now repealed and replaced
by S 11-20.1.
99. Fla. Stat. Ann. S 847.014 (Supp. 1978). Now repealed and replaced by
S 847.071.
100. Ky. Rev. Stat. SS 531.300-.370 (Supp. 1978) and N.Y. Penal Law SS 263.00-.25
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speech that contains explicit sexual depictions of children. However,
the statutes which incorporate an obscenity requirement (#1 & 2) often
define it in terms of variable obscenity. 1 ' As one commentator
explained: "[U]se of the variable obscenity provision seems the only
possible way to arrive at a finding of obscenity for material that
depicts children . . ., because [it is the sexually deviant pedophile not]
the average adult presumably [who] would . . find sexual depictions
of children appealing to his prurient interest."' '
FIGURE 3
USE OF OBSCENITY DEFINITIONS IN CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
STATUTES
Application to
Solicitation & Production
Offenses
Yes No
Application Yes
to
Distribution No
Offenses
Child Pornography Decisions
Were these child pornography statutes constitutional? In four
early cases, state statutes were challenged primarily on first amend-
ment and due process grounds. In two of these cases the defendants
claimed that the statutes were vague and that they were also over-
broad, because they contained no obscenity requirement for produc-
tion offenses.
In a Florida case, Griffin v. State,"° the defendant pled no con-
test to charges of procuring and using a minor in the production of
obscene photographs. On appeal he contended that the Florida Statute
(McKinney Supp. 1978).
101. Variable obscenity evaluates the sexual depictions of children or other
susceptible groups including sexually deviant pedophiles when it appears from the
character of the material or the circumstances of its distribution to be directed at
such audiences.
102. Note, Child Pornography: A New Role for the Obscenity Doctrine, supra
note 86.
103. 396 So.2d 152 (Fla. 1981).
1 2
Illinois Florida
3 4
NY & KY
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847.014, which made it unlawful "to procure a minor to perform
or participate in any photograph, motion picture, exhibition, show,
representation or other production, in whole or in part, which depicts
sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse [and to
produce same] involving a minor," was void for vagueness. °4 The
Florida Supreme Court held "the statute is impervious to attack on
grounds of vagueness, as a person of common intelligence has adequate
notice of the conduct proscribed."'' 5 The court also dismissed the argu-
ment that the material could not be found obscene, because the statute
failed to incorporate the Miller test: "the statute . . .does not pro-
scribe constitutionally protected speech or activities, but
specific conduct relating to minors.""' 6 Since the statute had been con-
stitutionally applied, the court found the defendant did not have stand-
ing to challenge the statute for overbreadth. 7
In a Kentucky case, Payne v. Commonwealth,"' the defendant had
been convicted of sodomy, sexual abuse, and using a minor in a sexual
performance."' On appeal, he contended that the prohibition in
Kentucky Revised Statutes 531.310 on "the use of minors in actual
or simulated 'acts of ... homosexuality or lesbianism' [was] unconstitu-
tionally vague,""' because it was unclear whether the activity pro-
hibited included "such seemingly innocuous activity as 'two females
embracing or two males standing with their arms around each
other.' ""' The Supreme Court of Kentucky replied: "[tihe definitional
section [of the statute] read as a whole, coupled with a reference to
any standard dictionary should provide the ordinary person of com-
mon sense a clear enough indication of the type of acts prohibited.""'
The Court then went on to consider the appellant's argument that
the statute was overbroad because it prohibited constitutionally pro-
tected conduct. The Court distinguished between statutes in terms
of the degree of constitutional scrutiny protecting a minor from actual
104. Fla. Stat. S 847.014 (1977).
105. Griffin, 396 So. 2d at 154.
106. Id. at 155.
107. Id. at 155-56.
108. 523 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1981).
109. In Payne the defendant had been convicted in Fayette Circuit Court of
sodomy, sexual abuse, and using a minor in a sexual performance. "Seven of the twenty
counts of using a minor in a sexual performance [were] predicated upon appellant's
act of videotaping a sexual performance by boys under the age of sixteen years. The
remaining thirteen counts . . . [were] predicated upon appellant's act of taking
photographs of a juvenile less than sixteen years of age engaged in sexual conduct."
Id. at 869.
110. Id. at 871. (Quoting Ky. Rev. Stat. S 531.310 (1978)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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use in a sexual performance and those dealing with the distribution
of materials portraying those sexual performances. Statutes such as
K.R.S. 531.310 which "protect children from the conduct of being used
in a sexual performance""' 3 do not give rise to free speech considera-
tions involved in the sale of child pornography."' As a consequence,
"[a]ny overbreadth problems must be considered then in light of the
less favored position of conduct in the constitutional framework."'' 5
Erznoznick required that the statute's "deterrent effect on legitimate
expression [must be] both real and substantial.""' Applying the Erz-
noznick test, the court concluded that "[any deterrent effect on
legitimate expression" of the photographed and videotaped conduct
of minors engaged in sexual performances could "not be said to be
real and substantial." 7
These two decisions by the Florida and Kentucky Supreme
Courts suggested that the procurement and production offenses of
state statutes were not susceptible to vagueness and overbreadth
challenges, because the statutes gave adequate notice to a person of
common intelligence and the proscribed conduct was not protected
speech. At the same time, two other state statutes which made
distribution an offense were challenged in federal court on first amend-
ment and due process ground with different results.
In a Texas case, Graham v. Hill,"8 a movie theatre and bookstore
manager was prosecuted for violating the Texas Penal Code, section
43.25 which made it unlawful for a person to sell, distribute, or possess
for sale or distribution "any motion picture or photograph showing
a person younger than 17 years of age observing or engaging in sex-
ual conduct.""' 9 The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment
on the grounds of the statute's unconstitutional overbreadth. The
federal district court granted the motion. Section 43.25 was overbroad,
because it failed to include "the most basic requirement-that... the
photograph or motion picture be obscene. (citations omitted) As a
result. . .its deterrent effect on protected conduct is both real and
substantial, especially considering the severe sanctions for violation
of the statute.' 20
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 872.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 444 F. Supp. 584 (W. D. Tex. 1978).
119. Tex. Penal Code Ann. S 43.25(a) (Vernon 1977) (statute amended in 1979).
120. Graham, 444 F. Supp. at 592, 593.
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In a New York case, St. Martin's Press v. Carey,2' the state
legislature had passed a child pornography statute which contained
both production and dissemination offenses. Section 263.15 made it
unlawful "to promote a sexual performance by a child when... he
produces, directs, or promotes any performance which includes sex-
ual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age.""' Shortly before
its effective date, St. Martin's requested an injunction against its
enforcement. The publisher claimed that section 263.15 would prohibit
their publication, distribution, advertisement, and sale of the book
Show Me!, because it was unconstitutionally broad. St. Martin's claimed
that Show Me! was not obscene, but that section 263.15 would pro-
hibit its publication. The publisher argued that the statute ap-
plied to motion pictures or photographs of children involved in sex-
ual conduct whether or not they were obscene. 3 St. Martin's also
claimed that section 263.15 was unconstitutional, because it was a
denial of due process. New York, the publisher claimed, may prevent,
its children from being exploited, but that purpose had no rational
application to Show Me!, because the book was produced in Germany
between 1969 and 1973.124
The district court granted the preliminary injunction, because
of the statute's apparent overbreadth12' and because the book which
clearly fell within the statute might be protected first amendment
speech,"26 and as a consequence, its removal from the marketplace
would cause irreparable harm to the publisher's constitutional rights."
The court was, however, more persuaded by the publisher's due
process argument. It agreed that New York could not make criminal
"the dissemination of photographs of children taken outside the United
States some years before the effective date of the statute.""' On
appeal, the decision was reversed, because the Second Circuit found
that the suit did not involve a case or controversy where there was
a lack of state prosecutorial activity 129 and the book did not come
within the statutory language for due process reasons. 'We fail to
see," the Court of Appeals concluded, "how the New York legislature
has any legitimate concern with German children in the years before
1973 .. .
121. 605 F.2d 41 (2nd Cir. 1979), 440 F. Supp. 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
122. N.Y. Penal Law S 263.15 (Consol. 1977).
123. 440 F. Supp. at 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1206.
126. Id. at 1205.
127. Id. at 1203.
128. Id. at 1205.
129. 605 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1979).
130. Id. at 44.
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New York v. Ferber
When the United States Supreme Court considered the child por-
nography issue for the first time, the major constitutional issue was
whether a state "consistent with the First Amendment [could] pro-
hibit the dissemination of material which shows children engaged in
sexual conduct regardless of whether the material is obscene.""' The
case, New York v. Ferber, involved a bookstore owner who had been
convicted of promoting the sexual performance of a child under the
same statute that had been at issue in St. Martin's Press: section
263.15.132 Ferber had argued that the statute was unconstitutionally
overbroad, because it did not contain a requirement that the child's
performance be obscene.'33 This time, however, the overbreadth
challenge came before the state supreme court with a different result.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction because the
statute would "in many, if not all, cases prohibit the promotion of
materials which are traditionally entitled to constitutional protection
from government interference under the First Amendment."" On ap-
peal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment
unanimously.' 5
Justice White, writing for the Court, first identified the state's
interest in regulating child pornography. "The state's interest in
'safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor' is
'compelling.""' Prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children,
he said, "constitutes a governmental objective of surpassing
importance.""' 7 The New York statute's regulation of distribution was
an appropriate means to promote the state's interest. "The advertis-
ing and selling of child pornography provides an economic motive for
... [its] production. . . .,,,3 Moreover, its distribution "is intrinsically
related to the sexual abuse of children [, because]. . .the materials
produced are a permanent record of the children's participation and
the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation."1 9 At the
131. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 754.
132. People v. Ferber, 96 Misc.2d 669, 409 N.Y.S.2d 632, 634 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1978).
133. 52 N.Y.2d 674, 677, 422 N.E.2d 523, 524, 525 (N.Y. 1981).
134. 422 N.E.2d at 525.
135. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). A majority opinion written by Justice White
was joined by four members of the Court: Chief Justice Berger and Justices O'Connor,
Powell, and Rehnquist. Separate concurrences were written by Justice Brennan join-
ed by Marshall, Justice Stevens, and Justice O'Connor. Justice Blackmun concurred
in the result.
136. Id. at 756, 757.
137. Id. at 757.
138. Id. at 761.
139. Id at 759.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss2/3
CHILDREN AND PORNOGRAPHY
same time, the value of permitting children to appear in pornographic
films and photographs was "exceedingly modest, if not deminimus."''
In these circumstances, where the evil to be restricted "so overwhelm-
ingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any at stake," a content-
based classification was permissible."' Justice White concluded:
When a definable class of material, such as that covered
by § 263.15, bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare
of children engaged in its production, we think the balance
of competing interests is clearly struck and that it is per-
missible to consider these materials as without the protec-
tion of the First Amendment."2
How could child pornography be regulated? Justice White found
that the Miller obscenity standard could not be used, because it was
an output-oriented standard which focused on the harm the material
posed to society and not an input-oriented standard which applied to
the psychological harm inflicted on the child. As he stated concisely:
[Tihe question under the Miller test of whether a work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest [or is
patently offensive to] the average person bears no connec-
tion to the issue of whether the child has been physically
or psychologically harmed in the production of the work
.... It is [also] irrelevant to the [abused] child ... whether
or not the material... has a literary, artistic, political, or
social value.'4
Miller's community standard test was also inapplicable to the evalua-
tion of child pornography. "It would be equally unrealistic to equate
a community's toleration for sexually oriented material with the per-
missible scope of legislation aimed at protecting children from sexual
exploitation."'"
Child pornography would be judged by a separate four-part test:
(1) adequate definition of the offensive sexual conduct, (2) visual depic-
tion, (3) the minority of the subject, and (4) the knowledge of the defen-
dant. According to Justice White, "the conduct to be prohibited must
be adequately defined by the state law [,J . . .limited to works that
visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age [, and
with] ...some element of scienter on the part of the defendant."'145
140. Id. at 762.
141. Id. at 763, 764.
142. Id. at 764.
143. Id at 761.
144. Id. at 761 n.12.
145. Id. at 764, 765.
19851
Green: Children and Pornography:  An Interest Analysis in System Perspec
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1985
462 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19
The New York child pornography statute met this test. The con-
duct and context were sufficiently limited. Section 263.15 forbade the
performance by a minor of "actual or simulated sexual intercourse,
deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation,
sadomasochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals .... [in] any
play, motion picture, photograph or dance, or any other visual per-
formance exhibited before an audience."'"" The statute also forbade
the knowing promotion of "sexual performances by a child under the
age of sixteen by distributing material which depicts such
performances.'
47
What remained to be addressed was the claim that the statute
was unconstitutionally overbroad, because it prohibited the distribu-
tion of medical and educational materials that portrayed adolescent
sex in a non-obscene manner. In response, Justice White said that
where conduct and not merely speech is involved, Broadrick v.
Oklahoma'" had held that "the overbreadth of a statute must not on-
ly be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep."'' Applying Broadrick, he said that Ferber
was "the paradigmatic case of a state statute whose legitimate reach
dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications."" Section 263.15 might
forbid the distribution of material with serious literary, scientific, or
educational value, but "these arguably impermissible applications
[would] amount to [no] more than a tiny fraction of the material within
the statute's reach.""' As a consequence, section 263.15 was not
substantially overbroad."'
In sum, Ferber upheld a New York and Kentucky-type child por-
nography statute" which dispenses with the obscenity requirement
for the promotion and distribution of visual child pornography. What
then of the Miller standard of obscenity? Miller v. California remains
applicable to all obscene sexual representations of children in books,
magazines, pamphlets, and oral recordings, but not visual materials.54
However, the concurring opinions in Ferber suggest that the Court
146. Id. at 751.
147. Id. at 749.
148. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
149. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 770 (Quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613).
150. Id. at 773.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Figure 3 in text, at 456.
154. Note, Child Pornography: A New Exception to the First Amendment-New
York v. Ferber, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 684, 696-97 (1983).
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did not necessarily dispose of the Miller LAPS test when it decided
that overbreadth challenges to child pornography statutes must meet
Broadrick's demanding real and substantial test. Justice O'Connor
stated: "the Court does not hold that New York must accept material
with serious literary, scientific, or educational value."'55 Justice
Brennan, joined by Marshall, went even further when he said: "depic-
tions of children that in themselves do have serious literary, artistic,
scientific, or medical value, would not violate the First Amendment. ''
Justice Stevens, however, saw no reason for the Court to discuss the
matter, because there had been no claim that the material at issue
in Ferber had any socially redeeming value. 7 In spite of these reserva-
tions, the Ferber child pornography test would be likely to dispose
of almost all first amendment overbreadth and vagueness challenges.
The decision did not, however, directly address two issues raised in
pre-Ferber cases: the privacy rights of parents and adults and the
due process right implicated by the exercise of the state's police power
on behalf of children in foreign jurisdictions. 8
155. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 774 (O'Connor concurring).
156. Id. at 776 (Brennan with Marshall concurring).
157. Id. at 777 (Stevens concurring).
158. Two prosecutions under the federal Protection of Children Against Sexual
Abuse Act of 1978, 18 U.S.C. 2423, 2251-53, will not be examined in the text but briefly
mentioned here.
U.S. v. Langford, 688 F.2d 1088 (7th Cir. 1982) involved the issue of whether
a prosecution under section 2252 was properly venued in the sending state and the
jury was properly instructed to apply that state's community standard. The Seventh
Circuit rejected the appellant's argument that the community standards of the receiv-
ing jurisdiction should apply, because it interpreted the appellants argument as an
attack on the validity of the venue statute for federal obscenity cases, 18 U.S.C. S
3237(a) which "authorizes federal obscenity cases to be venued in either the sending
jurisdiction, the receiving jurisdiction, or in any jurisdiction through which the mailed
obscenity moves." Id. at 1094. The court found that this expansive view of section
3237(a) reflected a congressional interest "in protecting minors in ... each and every
aspect of the illicit pornographic scheme" to which the Supreme Court had given its
support in Ferber (458 U.S. at 1095).
U.S. v. Nemuras, 567 F. Supp. 87 (D.Md. 1983) involved the issue of whether
sexually explicit photographs, here defined as lewd exhibition of the genitals in sec-
tion 2253, were taken with the knowledge that they would be distributed in interstate
commerce in violation of section 2251. The court found that the evidence was clear
that the photographs were distributed in interstate commerce. Therefore, the "sole
issue" was whether the photographs were lewd. "In the court's view . . . lewd
photographs of children [were] those in which the child is depicted as half or partially
clothed, posed in such a way as to depict or suggest a willingness to engage in sexual
activity or a sexually coy attitude." Id. at 89. The court then found that the photographs
fit within its definition and upheld the defendant's conviction. Id. at 90.
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Impact of Ferber
State child pornography prosecutions have continued since Ferber.
Defendants in these cases have continued to raise overbreadth,
vagueness, substantive due process, and right to privacy arguments.
What impact Ferber has had will be examined at two levels: first at
the trial court level in Kentucky in the distribution case of Com-
monwealth v. Mikesell"9 and at the state appellate court level in one
distribution case, People v. Enea,6' and two production cases: State
v. Shuck61 and State v. Jordan."'
a. In Trial Court
What is the impact of Ferber at the trial court level in a jurisdic-
tion with a child pornography statute analogous to New York's? A
Kentucky prosecution for the distribution of child pornography,
Commonwealth v. Mikesell," will serve as an illustration. In Mikesell,
the Lexington-Fayette Urban County police had established a fictitious
organization, the Kentucky Adolescent Center (KyAC) to identify per-
sons involved in child pornography." In its letters to suspects, KyAC
was presented as a non-profit clearing house for putting members in
touch with each other for the purpose of producing, trading, and sell-
ing child pornography.' The defendant, Donald Mikesell, responded
to the solicitation and in a meeting in a local hotel room agreed to
loan an undercover police detective his collection of magazines,
photographs, and films.' A month later, Mikesell wrote the detec-
tive complaining that he had received no material from him in
exchange for the loan, asking for the return of his material, and an
end to their relationship.' 7 Instead, a prosecution was initiated under
the Kentucky child pornography statute which prohibits the "distribu-
tion of matter portraying a sexual performance of a minor.""' Mikesell
159. Comm. v. Mikesell, No. 83-CR-208 Fayette Cir. Ct., Ky. June 8, 1983
(Angellucci, J.) (order overruling defendant motion to dismiss the indictment on con-
stitutional grounds).
160. 665 P.2d 1026 (Colo. 1983).
161. 661 P.2d 1020 (Wash. App. 1983).
162. 665 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1983).
163. Mikesell (court's order), No. 83-CR-208.
164. Id. at 2.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 3.
167. Id.
168. Ky. Rev. Stat. S 531.340(1) (1978). The Kentucky child pornography statute
which prohibits "distribution of matter portraying a sexual performance of a minor"
provides in relevant part:
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did not dispute that the material portrayed "a sexual performance
by a minor" as the phrase was used in the statute, 9 but in his attempt
to dismiss the charges challenged the statute on constitutional grounds:
its overbreadth and its intrusion on his right to privacy.
The Fayette Circuit Court first turned its attention to the defen-
dant's two overbreadth arguments. Mikesell argued that under K.R.S.
531.300(1), distribution required the "transfer of possession" of the
materials. " However, the statute was inapplicable here, because his
"loan" of material was not commercial distribution, but merely a
transfer of custody, "a non-commercial delivery for temporary
examination.''. Mikesell also argued that K.R.S. 531.300(1) could only
protect Kentucky minors from involvement in the production of por-
nography. Here, however, the statute was overbroad, because "the
pictures were taken of persons outside Kentucky and at a time prior
to the enactment (in 1978) of K.R.S. 531.300."'' His "loan" of a pic-
ture "long since produced, duplicated, sold, and circulated about the
country ... " he concluded, "did not make it a more or less perma-
nent record.'' 3
The Court dismissed the defendant's overbreadth arguments. The
loan of the material was a transfer of possession as defined by K.R.S.
500.080(14), because it involved a transfer of "actual physical posses-
sion . . .or control over a tangible object." 174 No transfer of interest
in property was required. Therefore, when the defendant transferred
possession, it was an act in violation of the statute."' The Court also
found unpersuasive, in light of Ferber, the defendant's argument that
he loaned material produced outside Kentucky. In Ferber, the Supreme
Court had concluded: 'it is often impossible to determine where such
A person is guilty of distribution of matter portraying a sexual performance of a minor
when, having knowledge of its content and character, he:
(a) sends or causes to be sent into this state for sale or distribution; or
(b) brings or causes to be brought into this state for sale or distribution; or
(c) in this state, he: (1) exhibits for profit or gain; or (2) distributes; or (3) offers to
distribute; or (4) has in his possession with the intent to distribute, exhibit for profit
or gain or offer to distribute, any matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor.
169. Ky. Rev. Stat. S 531.300(4), (6) (1978).
170. Mikesell, No. 83-CR-208 at 5 (Memorandum for Defendant on Consitutional
Issues).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 8.
173. Id. at 23.
174. Mikesell (court order), 83-CR-208 at 4.
175. Id.
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material is produced' ....,"' Ferber also held that since child por-
nography is not protected by the first amendment, "a state is not
barred from prohibiting the distribution of unprotected material pro-
duced outside the state."'177 Moreover, the circuit court dismissed as
irrelevant the defendant's contention that the films and photographs
were several years old. A principal concern of the Court in Ferber
had been to uphold a state statute similar to Kentucky's in order to
prohibit the continued circulation of the "permanent record" of the
child's act in the mass distribution system of child pornography for
years after the photographs were taken.17
The Fayette Circuit Court then turned its attention to Mikesell's
two privacy claims. The defendant argued that his loan of materials
was protected by his federal right to privacy. Stanley v. Georgia's
right to possess obscene materials applied to him, because 'a hotel
is for these purposes the same as a house." '179 Moreover, his loan of
the material was not affected by the limitation of the right to receive
after Stanley.
In every case limiting the application of Stanley, there was
a public element present .... None of these elements are
present here. None of the post-Stanley cases have so limited
its holding to permit states to constitutionally outlaw a
private not-for-consideration loan of any form of com-
municative materials from one individual to another, con-
ducted at a location in which the lender had a reasonable
expectation of privacy. 8 °
Mikesell also argued that he was protected by the state's right to
privacy announced in Commonweath v. Campbell' which went beyond
the First Amendment rights under the Federal Constitution.'82 This
right, he argued, extended to his circumstances, because
Commonwealth v. Smith" made it clear that friends sharing their vices
together are entitled to the same protection as an individual acting
privately in his home."'"
176. Id. at 5 (Quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 766 n. 19 (1982)).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 5, 8.
179. Mikesell (defendant's memorandum), 83-CR-208 at 16 (citing Stanley, 394
U.S. 557, 565 (1969)).
180. Id. at 26.
181. 133 KY. 50, 117 S.W. 383 (Ky.App. 1909).
182. Mikesell (defendant's memorandum), 83-CR-208 at 17.
183. 163 KY. 227, 173 S.W. 340, (Ky.App. 1915).
184. Mikesell (defendant's memorandum), 83-CR-208 at 17.
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The Court dismissed Mikesell's federal right to privacy claim on
two grounds. First, Stanley held that mere possession of obscene
materials in one's own home could not be made a crime. The defen-
dant's behavior involved more than mere possession. "[T]he defendant
expected to be able to 'borrow' another's collection of child por-
nography in return for the loan. This could arguably constitute 'con-
sideration' for the loan which would further remove it from the
category of 'mere possession'."'" The Court then concluded that Ferber
had approved state regulation of the defendant's activity, because
"[l]oans made to individuals for the purpose of copying child por-
nography give the 'permanent record' of the child's act wider circula-
tion for years after the original photograph was taken."'" Second, the
Court found that Stanley had not dealt with child pornography. Ferber
had, however, "ruled that child pornography is not protected by the
First Amendment if it involves scienter and the category is suitably
limited and described to include only visual depictions of sexual con-
duct by children."18 ' Thus the court concluded that Ferber would not
allow a defendant's right to privacy to frustrate the government's com-
pelling interest in preventing the sexual exploitation of children.'88
Then the court turned to the defendant's state privacy claim. It was
"not unmindful" that Kentucky had a broader right to privacy than
under the federal constitution, but it found that the defendant's argu-
ment was "grounded primarily on cases which the Court finds inap-
plicable . . . [because] the Kentucky legislature has recently shown
its concern about the protection of children by the passage of the
statute in question."
1 89
b. .In Appellate Courts
The Mikesell case never went to trial; the defendant accepted
a plea bargain. In the aftermath of Ferber, many other child por-
nography cases have probably been disposed of in a similar manner.
Appeals in cases where the defendant was tried and convicted have
raised overbreadth and privacy issues similar to those examined in
Mikesell. They have been rejected in all three reported state cases
which will be discussed below.
185. Mikesell (court's order), 83-CR-208 at 8.
186. Id.
187. Id. (Quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758 (1982)).
188. Id. at 7-8.
189. Id. at 9.
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In the only distribution case, People v. Enea,9' the defendant
claimed on appeal that Colorado statute, section 18-6-403' 9' denied him
due process, because it was vague. The Colorado Supreme Court
dismissed the challenge, because Enea's "bald assertion of vagueness"
was insufficient "to overcome the presumption of constitutionality to
which the statute is entitled."'92 The Court then turned to the defen-
dant's principal argument: the statute was overbroad, because it pro-
hibited his participation in the sale of non-obscene photographic
materials. Ferber, the Court said, was dispositive: these materials were
unprotected by the first amendment.'9 3 Since the defendant had made
no claim that the materials had artistic, educational, medical, or scien-
tific value, the Court also found it unnecessary to reach the over-
breadth issue.'
In State v. Shuck," the first of two production cases decided since
Ferber, the defendant argued on appeal that the Washington child
pornography statute, chapter 9.68A 1' was unconstitutionally overbroad
on its face, because "the preparation of educational materials depict-
ing non-obscene adolescent sex falls within the ambit of the statute."'"
The Washington Court of Appeals answered: Ferber made it clear that
"given the overriding governmental concern for the physiological,
emotional, and mental health of the children involved,"'99 the child por-
nography statute did not violate the first amendment under the
substantial overbreadth rule of Broaderick,'99 because it proscribed
works of serious educational value.2 0
The other production case, State v. Jordan,2' 1 involved a challenge
to the constitutionality of Utah statute, section 76-10-1206.5. 202 The
Supreme Court of Utah dismissed the defendant's three constitutional
challenges. First, the Court rejected the argument that the state had
no right to prohibit acts which were not obscene under the Miller
test.2 3 Ferber had rejected the Miller standard and then created its
own four-part test for child pornography. Judged by the Ferber stan-
190. 665 P.2d 1026.
191. Colo. Rev. Stat. S 18-6-403 (Supp. 1980).
192. Enea, 665 P.2d at 1027.
193. Id. at 1028.
194. Id.
195. Shuck, 661 P.2d at 1020 (Wash.App. 1983).
196. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. S 9.68A (1981).
197. Shuck, 661 P.2d at 1022.
198. Id.
199. 413 U.S. 601'(1973).
200. Shuck, 661 P.2d at 1022.
201. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280.
202. Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-12065 (Supp. 1981).
203. Jordan, 665 P.2d at 1283.
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dard, the Utah statute was not substantially overbroad. 20 4 Second, the
Court rejected the claim that the statute invaded the right of privacy
of consenting people in their homes. This broad reading of Stanley
v. Georgia,0 5 the Court said, was a "sophistic argument [that] ignores
the fact that we are not dealing with two consenting adults in the
privacy of their own home."206 Here the right to privacy could not
frustrate the state's compelling interest in protecting minors against
sexual exploitation. Third, the Court rejected the claim that the
statutory phrase "simulated sexual conduct" was so vague as to deny
the defendants due process, because the phrase was sufficiently
defined by the statute to warn of the proscribed conduct.
21
c. Conclusions
This brief survey of post-Ferber cases suggests the following ten-
tative conclusions about state child pornography statutes. Courts are
unlikely to be receptive to vagueness challenges to either production
or distribution offenses. Overbreadth challenges will meet with a
similar reception. Courts are unlikely to accept a narrow construc-
tion of the distribution offense which would exclude a "loan" of child
pornography. Loans are part of the network of commercial distribu-
tion. State power to control child pornography produced in other
jurisdictions, challenged before Ferber on due process grounds, will
now be rejected on overbreadth grounds. States are not prohibited
from suppressing the distribution of unprotected material. Overbreadth
challenges to both production and distribution offenses based on the
claim that the child pornography at issue is non-obscene under Miller
will be rejected, unless the defendant makes a claim that the material
has educational, medical, or scientific value. Privacy claims by pro-
ducers and distributors will not shelter the sexual exploitation of
minors. Stanley continues to be narrowly construed. Post-Ferber courts
have said that Stanley protects the use of obscene material by con-
senting adults, not the production of child pornography. Stanley also
protects merely possession in one's home, it does not extend to the
right to receive borrowed or loaned materials, because they are part
of the scheme of commercial distribution.
CONCLUSIONS
What is the current status of laws regulating the sexual exploita-
tion of children in the pornographic marketplace? Participation of
204. Jordan, 665 P.2d at 1284.
205. 393 U.S. 557 (1969).
206. Jordan, 665 P.2d at 1285.
207. Jordan, 665 P.2d at 1285-86.
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children in the creation of visual child pornography will be judged
by the Ferber four-part test. Distribution will be judged differently
depending upon the subject and form of the material. If it is visual
child pornography, irrespective of the identity of its intended audience,
it will also be judged by the Ferber test. If it is distributed to children
in the form of books, magazines, or movies then Ginsberg and
Erznoznick hold that it must be obscene for children. If, however,
the material is broadcast by radio and children are likely to be in
the audience, then Pacifica holds it need be merely indecent to be
prohibited, but not necessarily indecent to children.
How has the Supreme Court's response to the sexual exploita-
tion of children affected the legal interests of the participants? There
is no adult, parental, or child right (as defined by Models 2, 3, and
4) to produce or distribute child pornography. Adults have no right
to exploit those persons incapable of consent, nor do parents have
any authority to abuse minor children entrusted to their care. Only
the Model 1 governmental interest based on the parens patriae and
police powers to insure the well-being of children has been recognized
by the Court. With obscenity legislation, the Court has recognized
that an adult's right to distribute and receive protected materials
under Model 2 differs from a child's right under Model 4. A parent
has the discretion under Model 3 to purchase obscene material for
their children, but none in the receipt of indecent broadcast material.
Model 1 governmental interests in the protection of the child and
parental assistance have justified a different standard for the sale
of obscene material to minors under Model 4 and a restriction on
parental discretion under Model 3 in the receipt of indecent broad-
cast material. However, as Erznoznick and Pacifica make clear, the
Court has yet to confront the implications of that choice for Model
4 adult rights on the public streets and in the broadcast media.
In conclusion, the Burger Court has created two-child based
exceptions to the obscenity doctrine since Miller, but with entirely
different results. Two years after Ferber, there are few unanswered
questions about the constitutional status of child pornography statutes.
Only the issue of whether child pornography may have scientific,
medical, or educational value remains to be examined. Six years after
the Pacifica decision, the opposite circumstance prevails. Justice
Brennan's questions remain to be answered by the Commission and
the Court. Consequently, no one knows the meaning of a broadcast
indecency standard, nor what action the FCC may take to protect
the interests of children in the audience.
[Vol. 19
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss2/3
